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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we aim to discuss how Portuguese prisoners know and what they feel about surveillance
mechanisms related to the inclusion and deletion of the DNA proﬁles of convicted criminals in the
national forensic database. Through a set of interviews with individuals currently imprisoned we focus
on the ways this group perceives forensic DNA technologies. While the institutional and political
discourses maintain that the restricted use and application of DNA proﬁles within the national forensic
database protects individuals’ rights, the prisoners claim that police misuse of such technologies
potentially makes it difﬁcult to escape from surveillance and acts as a mean of reinforcing the stigma of
delinquency. The prisoners also argue that additional intensive and extensive use of surveillance devices
might be more protective of their own individual rights and might possibly increase potential for
exoneration.
Crown Copyright  2011 Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Current state concerns with crime control and the securitisation
have led an increasing number of governments to invest in a
variety of new bio-information technologies to manage the risks
posed by criminal elements and terrorist groups. Chief amongst
these new bio-information technologies has been DNA proﬁling or
DNA ﬁngerprinting, frequently described as the greatest break-
through in forensic science since ﬁngerprinting and as the gold
standard for individual identiﬁcation. Following the earlier
widespread adoption in many other European countries, in
February 2008, the Portuguese law for the forensic DNA database
for criminal identiﬁcation was passed [1]. The database is expected
to become operational during 2010.
The regulation of the Portuguese forensic DNA database is more
restrictive in terms of data inclusion and information preservation
than other European countries [2]. Unlike some countries that do not* Corresponding author. Tel.: +351 253604212; fax: +351 253676966.
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purposes, Portuguese legislation sought to protect the possibility of
each and every individual of having a ‘‘clean slate’’ in society, ‘‘free’’
from any sort of ofﬁcial record that, in a direct manner, may associate
the individual with a crime committed in the past.
As one of the most effective tools in crime detection currently
available, the creation and organization of forensic DNA databases
also involves potential threats to a range of individual rights, such as
the right to privacy, the right to liberty, the right to moral and physical
integrity, the dignity of individuals and the presumption of innocence.
From the point of view of surveillance studies, DNA databases can
represent one of the instances by which new and effective modes of
social control have been conﬁgured and associated to political and
governmental crime prevention and control strategies. The storage
of individuals’ DNA proﬁles in a database enables a greater
surveillance focus on potential offenders and re-offenders within
societies that are less tolerant towards suspect citizens [3] and
which is made easier by public support of the ﬁght against crime.
The adoption by state surveillance practices of scientiﬁc and
technological devices for corroborating or inferring identities [4]
has been examined by a considerable body of debate and research,
such as the studies of history of state identiﬁcation [5] and the co-
production of surveillance technologies and genetic suspects [6–8]
the work on the increasing use of forensic sciences in support of
criminal investigations [9–11]; ‘‘dataveillance’’ [12]; and visibility
and new forms of surveillance [13–16]. Williams and Johnson
[4,17] have made fundamental contributions to describing andd Ltd. All rights reserved.
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offered by DNA proﬁling and database as a developing instrumen-
tality of modern state surveillance. The forensic DNA databases
also constitute ‘‘centres of calculation’’ [18] whose installation
marks the expansion of bureaucratic surveillance in contemporary
society as part of a bio-surveillance apparatus.
This research work is supplemented by the existence of one
single published study carried out in Austria on the prisoners’
knowledge about forensic DNA technologies and their expecta-
tions with regard to the inclusion of criminals’ DNA proﬁles in the
database for the purposes of criminal investigation [19]. This paper
aims to provide additional understanding of the prisoners’
knowledge and social images concerning the co-production [8]
of surveillance and DNA proﬁling and databasing. In particular, we
discuss how Portuguese prisoners know and what they feel about
surveillance mechanisms related to the inclusion and removal of
the DNA proﬁles of convicted criminals in the national forensic
database. We argue that this represents a form of ‘‘governmen-
tality’’ [20], that is, the social uses of DNA databases for forensic
purposes impacts on self management of those whose actions and
identities are monitored in this way under such scrutiny.
Following the seminal work on biopolitics [21] and biosociality
[22], Lynch and McNally [8] proposed the concept of ‘‘biolegality’’,
that is, the creation of a symbiotic relationship between law and
biotechnology through which an ongoing process redeﬁnes the
rights and status of the suspect body and of criminal evidence. The
authors discuss how biolegality operates by creating suspect
identities [8]. They also argue that ‘‘although ‘selves’ are deeplyTable 1
Sample characteristics.
Prisoner Age Years of
schooling
Professional occupation Primary crime
David 42 6 Construction/Manager Attempted ho
Joa˜o 49 4 Stonemason Rape, assault 
Carlos 52 4 Auto Electrician Procurement, 
drug trafﬁckin
Joel 22 9 Industrial Weaver operator/
Unemployed
Aggravated ra
Joaquim 49 6 Joiner Severe sexual 
Amaro 40 4 Agriculture Homicide and
Gaspar 39 9 Bricklayer’s assistant/
Unemployed
Burglary, drug
Anto´nio 26 1 Pastry man Trafﬁcking an
Manuel 27 >12 Student Homicide and
Martim 27 4 Ironmonger Rape, attempt
Mariano 29 6 Plumber Homicide 
Jaime 29 6 Construction worker Homicide 
Daniel 36 >12 Bar bouncer Homicide and
Toma´s 28 9 Water-prooﬁng worker Rape and hom
Gil 33 7 Businessman Trafﬁcking an
Ovı´dio 33 >12 Plasterer/Businessman Drug trafﬁckin
Amadeu 43 6 Bricklayer’s assistant Homicide, bur
Nelson 35 >12 Security/Vigilance Sexual abuse 
Micael 31 10 Undifferentiated worker Sexual assault
specially dang
Emı´lio 32 9 Iron worker Homicide, sex
Feliciano 34 >12 Construction painter Homicide 
Artur 38 6 Electrician Aggravated bu
Frederico 54 6 Retailer Criminal organ
Valter 25 6 Electrician/Unemployed Kidnapping, ra
Luı´s 26 8 Carpenter’s assistant/
Electrician
Aggravated bu
Amaˆndio 31 9 Driller Homicide and
theft, aggrava
Ru´ben 31 >12 Computer Systems Analyst Aggravated fra
computer syst
Olega´rio 31 6 Paver Theft and perj
Henrique 37 4 Construction blacksmith Burglary and f
Miguel 44 >12 Auto mechanic Driving witho
Lucı´lio 34 10 Construction foreman Driving withoimplicated, suspect identity is primarily an object and product of
policing and forensic expertise, rather than a technically deﬁned basis
for the formation of individual and group identity’’ [8].
This paper aims to produce a contribution in the area of
surveillance studies by considering three important aspects: ﬁrst,
because it takes the standpoint of the surveillance subjects [23] by
inquiring into prisoners’ experiences and/or expectations of state
surveillance related to the information gathering and storage of
DNA proﬁles for the purposes of criminal investigation. Second, it
proceeds to understanding the heterogeneous elements that exist
within surveillance practices, through a focus on the dynamics of
submission and resistance to DNA forensic technologies developed
by criminal bodies. Third, it deconstructs the idea that devices of
surveillance and control through DNA databasing have a purely
negative character, by arguing that ex-prisoners might feel more
liberated and protected from control and repression by being
subject to surveillance.
2. Methods
After obtaining authorization from the General Board of Prison Services in 2009,
we conducted 31 semi-structured interviews to inmates in three prisons for male
adults in the north of Portugal between May and September 2009. The interviews
took 34 min on average and were conducted by three trained interviewers.
We devised a theoretical sample, based on representativeness by diversity and
exemplariness [24], and conjugated with a convenience sampling by considering
the individuals that would be more predisposed to participate in this study
according to the information gathered by the administration in each prison. Thus,
we obtained a diversiﬁed sample in terms of criminal record (type of crime and
duration of the sentencing) and socio-demographic characterization (Table 1). which led to imprisonment Sentence
micide 3 years and 10 months
4 years, 13 months
and 100 days
rape, aggravated rape, child and
g, sexual abuse
7 years and 6 months
pe 5 years and 6 months
abuse of minors 6 years
 attempted homicide 20 years
 use, theft 5 years and 6 months
d other illegal activities 5 years
 drug trafﬁcking 14 years
ed coercion, kidnapping 9 years and 3 months
17 years
16 years
 attempted homicide, arson 24 years
icide 21 years
d other illegal activities 6 years
g, possession of an illegal weapon 8 years
glary, theft 23 years
of a minor, burglary, theft, perjury 9 years
 with carnal intercourse and use of
erous means and rape
12 years and 1 month
ual coercion, theft 15 years
12 years
rglary, burglary, attempted aggravated theft 12 years
ization (leader), extortion, drug trafﬁcking, fencing 20 years
pe, burglary, aggravated burglary 18 years
rglary, motor vehicle theft, trespassing, fencing 9 years
 attempted homicide, drug trafﬁcking,
ted burglary
25 years
ud, document forgery, illegal access to a
em or network, credit card fraud, perjury
6 years
ury 3 years and 6 months
orgery 3 years
ut permit 5 months
ut permit 2 years
4 Interviewees were asked: ‘‘According to the law, after some time, the criminal
record must be cleared. The same applies to proﬁles in the national forensic database.
What do you think of this law?’’
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elaboration of conclusions were based on a qualitative approach, trying to associate
substantive analysis with theoretical construction [25]. Based on the scientiﬁc
literature on the subject, from which we highlight the similar study carried out in
Austria [19], and the previously established topics of the interview script as well as
on the categories which emerged from the interviews themselves, we identiﬁed the
main issues and concepts.
The collected data were systematically compared, contrasted, synthesized and
coded according to themes and, within these, by categories, closely following the
principles of the grounded theory [26], by which the objective is to raise new
concepts from the empirical reality under observation. The ﬁndings are reported
below with verbatim quotes from interview transcripts using pseudonyms.
3. Challenging security and threats to ex-convicts’ rights
The added value of the DNA database is said to be translated
into a swifter justice system which, thanks to DNA proﬁle matches,
now makes it possible to obtain more guilty pleas from suspects,
thus saving time and resources [27]. However, the dominant
conceptions of the idea of security were deﬁed by some of the
participants in this study. For example, Daniel, the only
interviewee with a higher education degree, talked about security
as an ‘‘illusionary’’ sociopolitical construction that can be
manipulated by political power by taking advantage of the media’s
exploitation of the population’s anxieties. The subject of ‘‘security
paranoia’’ was brought up by the interviewee when asked if he
would consider an expansion of the national forensic DNA
database:
Little by little we are moving towards that security paranoia. It’s an
illusion. Security is an illusion and people haven’t ﬁgured that out.
Whatever television [networks] sell, people like and demand life
sentences and death penalties and micro-chips inserted into
children because of the abductions.
Daniel also expressed concerns that the possible violation of
individual rights would not arise from keeping the DNA proﬁle in
the database, but from the misuse of that information. Daniel
provided speciﬁc examples and possible consequences of the
sharing of information with third party entities, such as being
rejected by banks when applying for credit and by potential
employers, while highlighting the ‘‘inﬁnite’’ potential uses of
genetic information:
Nothing should be eliminated from the police records, nor can it be.
Information must be kept always, always! It doesn’t bother me that
on an investigative level they keep the data, and that it is kept until
the day I die. It’s not that that scares me, it’s not that that scares me.
What does scare me, in fact, are the uses that might be made of that
sort of information.
According to Wallace [28], for any individual, having a DNA
proﬁle on a database raises several concerns regarding the
possibility of misuse or unauthorized access, threats to genetic
privacy or lack of consent for participation in controversial genetic
research, in spite of the undisputed potential to convict the guilty
and exculpate the innocent. In this sense, the fact that the
construction of DNA databases begins with those who are suspect
or incarcerated may provide further concerns related to the
dangers of trying to predict behaviours through physical and
genetic traits and characteristics [29].
4. The stigma of delinquency and the role of the usual suspects:
a plea for a universal database
The distrust towards the ‘‘real’’ future uses of the forensic DNA
database became more evident when the prisoners were asked
what they thought about removing the proﬁles from the databaseafter the offence is expunged from the criminal record. The
majority of our interviewees (20 individuals out of 31) were of the
opinion that that the proﬁles should not be removed from the DNA
database.4
The main emphasis in the discourse of the interviewees was
that the database had the potential to exonerate the innocent. In
other words, the interviewees felt that retaining the proﬁle in the
database was a ‘‘guarantee’’ against police intrusion in their lives
following their release from prison, as several interviewees
reported that the police tend to round up the ‘‘usual suspects’’
who ﬁt a certain proﬁle with regard to a certain crime. A similar
study with prisoners in Austria also indicates that this type of
perception regarding police investigative practices might have a
cross-cultural and transnational character, rather than being
associated to national idiosyncrasies [19].
Jaime argued for the creation of a universal database. Only then
would this sort of instrument be totally effective, he said. Both to
identify the guilty party and to prove the innocence of others:
There should be a genetic proﬁle of each citizen in the database, for
all purposes. Not only to make an identiﬁcation in order to convict,
but also to acquit. To make an identiﬁcation in a case of abduction,
disappearance, whatever. . .
Jaime’s words deconstructed the general assumption by police
detectives, judges, forensic scientists, politicians and the public in
general, that databases are used ﬁrst and foremost to identify those
guilty and to incriminate them (for a discussion about the
expansion of DNA databases, see [29–34]). In reality, state
surveillance practices based on the increasing accumulation of
genetic information not only negate or reverse the presumption of
innocence [35], but also, as Finn puts it, ‘‘they presuppose
criminality, deviance and threat as something that is latent in all
bodies. This in turn justiﬁes and reinforces increasingly broad and
expansive surveillance practices as the focus of the state shifts from the
individual body to aggregate populations’’ [36].
In point of fact, the deletion of prisoners’ DNA proﬁles from the
forensic DNA database was seen by the interviewees as a way of
reinforcing the role of the ‘‘usual suspect’’. Nelson also argued for
the creation of a universal database as a way to prevent the police
practices of seeking suspects based on their proﬁle as previous
offenders:
I think it’s bad that only the prison population has their genetic
information there [in the database]. It should apply to everyone. In
order to avoid discrimination and even more. . . we are the scum of
society [silence] because for every crime that occurs, they [the
police] will immediately go to the ones that are there [in the
database]. And then the honest man might pay for the sinner’s
faults.
The notion of justice underlying this narrative is common
among prisoners, who feel that the person who commits a crime
must pay for what he/she did, and the innocent must be protected.
This correspondence with the dominant cultural norms, social
values, dispositions and expectations concerning ‘‘suitable’’
responses of justice to criminal behaviours may contribute to
the reconﬁguration of prisoners’ identity in order to comply with
the social order.
The prisoners’ previous experiences with the criminal justice
system have led them to a particular redeﬁnition of their rights and
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the forensic database as a lost opportunity to prove their
innocence, instead of a beneﬁt and an opportunity for a ‘‘clean
sheet’’, ‘‘cleared’’ of any ofﬁcial record that could directly identify
them as perpetrators of past crime.
Gil talked about a ‘‘mark’’ which condemns him for the rest of
his life. He claimed that the ofﬁcial version of the authorities is that
the proﬁles have been removed, but that they do not actually do it.
This opinion is shared by the majority of the prisoners interviewed
who, based on their own experiences or those of their peers,
believed that the police agencies always keep information about
their criminal records, and thought that the same may occur with
the case of DNA proﬁles. In the group interviewed we found that
the levels of trust in the integrity of the police were generally low.
Thus, in order to ensure greater transparency in the criminal
investigation procedures, Gil argued that the proﬁles should never
be removed from the DNA database:
Gil: It all stays there. The government doesn’t have to tell stories
about how they will remove it [the proﬁle] because they won’t. It’s
another proof that the government and the police, in this case
regarding criminal investigation – I’m referring to the Polı´cia
Judicia´ria – don’t delete people’s records, they keep people’s records
[criminal records] for the rest of their lives. (. . .)
Interviewer: Do you think that the information on the database
should be deleted or should it remain forever?
Gil: It should remain forever in the database, for the whole life. It’s
like this, I made the mistake of lending money and no matter how
many years I still have ahead of me, I will live with this mark
[silence]. How does it help me to remove my proﬁle from the
database if I know that I will have to live with this mark for the rest
of my life? [silence]. . .
The individuals we interviewed conveyed the notion that the
increase of surveillance practices could contribute to a better
defence of their individual rights and make them feel more
protected against discriminatory practices aimed at ex-convicts. In
this sense, the solution found by many of the prisoners interviewed
to put an end to discrimination between ‘‘those who are in the
database and those who are not’’, and also to increase the efﬁcacy
of criminal investigation would be to create a universal database,
which would include the whole population. Other prisoners
argued for the widening of surveillance practices through the
expansion of the database’s criteria for inclusion, stating that all
those convicted should be included, regardless of the crime they
committed, the length of their sentence or even if they were given a
non-custodial sentence.
5. Questioning the DNA as a ‘‘truth’’ machine
The interviewees’ argument in favour of the expansion of
criteria in the national forensic database to include DNA proﬁles of
all citizens, or at least, all convicted individuals, appears to be
grounded on their notion that DNA technologies enable the
automatic identiﬁcation of ‘‘offenders’’. The belief in the ‘‘truth’’ of
DNA was not, however, absolute, like the data obtained in
interviews with prisoners in Austria [19]. Although the general
majority (25 individuals out of 31) of those we interviewed
perceived DNA as something that, being extracted from the body,
can be a unique token for identiﬁcation, they also believed that the
police can set them up and plant evidence at crime scenes to
incriminate a suspect.David pointed out that DNA merely proves that someone had
been at a crime scene or that someone planted DNA material of a
certain individual. Thus, by itself, DNA evidence is not a synonym
for truth:
[With DNA alone] you can’t really prove that the person was there
or committed the crime. . . the person could have been there earlier
and could have lost a hair before the crime. That evidence alone
cannot convict anyone. (. . .) It’s not something (. . .) that is taken as
the absolute truth, right? (. . .) Evidence can be planted, right?
The negative opinion of the criminal justice system revealed by
most interviewees concerns judges as much as the criminal
investigation police. The interviewees’ opinions of judges were
that they are biased against poor defendants and that they can be
just as incompetent in the appreciation of scientiﬁc evidence as in
their decision making. Hence, through automation, a DNA database
could eliminate the contingencies and discriminations generated
by the judges’ actions. Similarly, by increasing the speed and
efﬁcacy of criminal investigation, the automation of the identiﬁ-
cation of individuals rendered by the storage and computerization
of genetic information could avoid certain police practices aimed at
the usual suspects, such as: making unfounded accusations against
individuals that have been the target of criminal investigations in
the past; using fabricated or illegal incriminating procedures;
making use of violence to obtain confessions (mentioned by 3
prisoners) or to collect biological samples; and keeping illegal
databases of biological samples or DNA proﬁles.
Carlos: If they create a database [including] all citizens (. . .)
through the DNA they will automatically identify the individual in
question.
From the point of view of surveillance studies, the growing
number of databases of DNA proﬁles represents more extensive
means of social control and might represent a risk or a threat to
individuals’ rights. As Aas puts it, by referring to technological
devices for determination of identity, such as DNA proﬁles and
biometric methods, these ‘‘new methods [are] less time consuming,
they also introduce a new language – a binary language of ones and
zeroes which radically reduces possibilities for negotiation and
therefore also resistance’’ [37]. However, our interviewees felt
more protected by the automation provided by technology,
because of notions that their capacity for resistance and
negotiation is strongly hierarchical and it is not possible for
them to achieve success in that negotiation. Hence, automation
transposes the power of decision and its political character to
technology, perceived as neutral and effective, in a form of
‘‘mechanical objectivity’’ which ‘‘serves as an alternative to
personal trust’’ [38] and enables the redeﬁnition of the concept
of security because it is no longer necessary to prepare defence or
resistance strategies [39].
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed how individuals themselves
might be more implicated in the construction of suspects’
identities [40] and in the redeﬁnition of the rights and status of
suspect body than is usually described in the literature. We have
explored in detail one concrete case of bio-surveillance apparatus
by taking into account how knowledge about collection and
databasing of DNA proﬁles has effects on the self-management of
those whose action and identities are captured in this speciﬁc
method of surveillance. This case of bio-surveillance also
demonstrated a variant of biolegality [8], whose implications
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we interviewed of the regulation of the Portuguese national
forensic database and its particular stipulation that the DNA proﬁle
of convicted individuals must be removed a maximum of 10 years
after the sentence has been served.
This rule illustrates the orientation towards protecting citizens’
rights and maximizing the chances of reintegrating delinquents.
However, the prisoners we interviewed challenged this assump-
tion by mentioning how the elimination of DNA proﬁles from the
database will contribute to render individuals with prior convic-
tions more vulnerable to surveillance mechanisms, incriminatory
practices by the police and processes of targeting them as usual
suspects. In addition, they disagreed with the rule of removing the
proﬁles from the DNA database, insofar as they believe that the
proﬁles should be kept in order to enhance the database’s efﬁcacy.
The importance of self-management of the actions and identities of
those who are under surveillance (convicted individuals) seems to
contrast deeply with the intentions of those who create legal
mechanisms of surveillance (law makers and forensic scientists).
This particular group considered that the restrictive use of the
DNA forensic database would increase surveillance and the use of
DNA evidence could serve to perpetuate or even deepen their
stigma. The reasoning for that argument was based on the fear of
potential misuse of these technologies by the police and the
criminal justice system and the maintenance of ‘‘informal’’ police
databases even after the ofﬁcial removal of proﬁles of convicted
criminals from the national forensic DNA database. They therefore
were of the opinion that a broader and more intensive use of the
DNA forensic database would be more beneﬁcial and more
protective of their individual rights.
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